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ABSTRACT: The paper argues that a philosophically informative and mathematically precise characterization is possi-
ble by (i) describing a particular proposal for such a characterization, (ii) showing that certain criticisms of 
this proposal are incorrect, and (iii) discussing the general issue of what a characterization of logical con-
stants aims at achieving. 




Can there be a mathematically precise and philosophically informative characterization 
of logical constants? Gómez-Torrente’s answer to this question is negative: 
Logicians and philosophers of logic have often tried to offer philosophically richer characterizations of the 
notion of a logical expression than the one(s) suggested by the vague pragmatic principles just mentioned. 
These attempts usually characterize the notion of a logical expression ... in terms of alleged semantic, epis-
temic or mathematical peculiarities of the logical expressions. I conjecture that these attempts will not suc-
ceed, since it must be nearly impossible to model closely the vague and pragmatic notion of a logical expres-
sion in those terms. [Gómez-Torrente (2003)] 
One of the philosophical conclusions that seem to me to receive strong support from the [above criticisms of 
philosophical theories of logical constants] ... is that most (perhaps all) of the substantive philosophical con-
ceptions of the problem of logical constants may have created unsolvable versions of the problem. The 
search for a characterization of the intended set of logical expressions ... may be a hopeless project if it is re-
quired ... that the characterization be given in terms of mathematical concepts ... or unexplicated semantic and 
epistemic properties ... [Gómez-Torrente (2002), 31-32] 
I agree with Gómez-Torrente’s claim that our choice of logical constants involves, and 
should involve, pragmatic considerations, but I think this does not rule out the possi-
bility, or desirability, of a mathematically precise and philosophically informative char-
acterization of these constants. In this paper I will describe one proposal for a precise 
characterization of logical constants, explain why Gómez-Torrente’s criticism of this 
proposal is incorrect, and discuss the more general issue of what a characterization of 
logical constants aims at achieving.  
1. A Characterization of Logical Constants  
The characterization I will defend is one I proposed in Sher (1991, Ch. 3), incorporat-
ing elements from Mostowski (1957), Tarski (1966) and Lindström (1966): 
 
DEFINITION LT C is a ... logical term [constant] iff C is a truth-functional 
connective or C satisfies [the following] conditions ... on logical constants 
[Sher (1991), 56]: 
 
A. A logical constant C is syntactically an n-place predicate or functor (func-
tional expression) of level 1 or 2, n being a positive integer. 
B. A logical constant C is defined by a single extensional function and is 




C. A logical constant C is defined over models. In each model A over which 
it is defined, C is assigned a construct of elements of A corresponding to 
its syntactic category. Specifically I require that C be defined by a func-
tion fC such that given a model A (with universe A) in its domain: 
a. If C is a first-level n-place predicate, then fC(A) is a subset of An. 
b. If C is a first-level n-place functor, then fC(A) is a function from An 
into A. 
c.  If C is a second-level n-place predicate, then fC(A) is a subset of B1 ´ 
¼ ´ Bn, where for 1£i£n, 
   A    if i(C) is an individual 
Bi =  
     P(Am)   if i(C) is an m-place predicate 
(i(C) being the ith argument of C). 
d. If C is a second-level n-place functor, then fC(A) is a function from  
B1 ´ ¼ ´ Bn into Bn+1, where for 1£i£n+1, Bi is as defined in (c). 
D. A logical constant C is defined over all models (for the logic). 
E. A logical constant C is defined by a function fC which is invariant under 
isomorphic structures. That is, the following conditions hold: 
a. If C is a first-level n-place predicate, A and A’ are models with uni-
verses A and A’ respectively, <b1,...,bn>ÎAn, <b’1,...,b’n>ÎA’ n, and 
the structures <A,<b1,...,bn>> and <A’,<b’1,...,b’n>> are isomorphic, 
then <b1,...,bn>Î fC(A) iff <b’1,...,b’n>Î fC(A’). 
b. If C is a second-level n-place predicate, A and A’ are models with 
universes A and A’ respectively, <D1,...,Dn>ÎB1 ´ ¼ ´ Bn, 
<D’1,...,D’n>ÎB’1 ´ ¼ ´ B’n, (where for 1£i£n, Bi and B’i are as in 
(C.c)), and the structures <A,<D1,...,Dn>>, <A’,<D’1,...,D’n>> are 
isomorphic, then <D1,...,Dn>Î fC(A) iff <D’1,...,D’n>Î fC(A’).  
c.  Analogously for functors. [Ibid., 54-5] 
2. Gómez-Torrente’s Criticism 
According to Gómez-Torrente, the above definition provides a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for logical constancy. His criticism proceeds in three steps:  
1. Tarski’s (1966) definition of logical constants (a restricted version of my 
condition (E)) fails: 
[T]he question whether Tarski’s definition provides a sufficient condition for logical constancy, even for the 
classical quantificational languages for which it is intended, seems to have a clear negative answer. A counter-
example would be produced if, so to speak “by chance”, some constants not typically treated as logical de-
noted notions invariant under permutations in all universes of discourse. Persuasive counterexamples of this 
kind result if we consider predicates not treated as logical and which are predicated falsely of all individuals in 
all universes. These predicates denote a logical notion in all universes, namely the empty set (often, they de-
note the empty set in all possible universes). ‘Unicorn’, ‘heptahedron’, and ‘male widow’ are good candidates; 
by ‘heptahedron’ I abbreviate ‘regular polyhedron of seven faces’1. [Gómez-Torrente (2002), 18] 
                                                   
1Henceforth I will assume that this is the English meaning of ‘heptahedron’. 




2. Sher (1991) – i.e., my characterization – purports to overcome the problem with 
Tarski’s definition by introducing Condition (B): 
Gila Sher [1991] has proposed a definition of logical constancy ..., and she has considered an objection to her 
proposal essentially analogous to the one based on the existence of terms like ‘unicorn’, ‘heptahedron’, etc. In 
order to deny relevance to this objection, Sher says that under her proposal, a logical term is identified with the 
(class)-function that assigns to every (set)-universe the denotation of the term in the universe: 
logical terms are identified with their (actual) extensions, so that in the metatheory the definitions of logi-
cal terms are rigid. (...) Their (actual) extensions determine one and the same function over models, and 
this function is a legitimate logical operator. (...) ... we may say that the only way to understand the mean-
ing of a term used as a logical constant is to read it rigidly and formally, i.e., to identify it with the 
mathematical function that semantically defines it ([[Sher (1991),] 64-65]).  
[Gómez-Torrente (2002), 18-19] 
 
3. Condition (B) fails to overcome the problem with Tarski’s definition: 
This counterobjection is highly problematic. Suppose we had a primitive one-place logical predicate ‘Æ’ in 
mathematical languages, whose meaning was given simply by the stipulation that it abbreviates the expression 
‘is not identical with itself’. Under Sher’s proposal, ‘Æ’, ‘unicorn’, ‘heptahedron’, ‘male widow’, etc. are all the 
same term, and hence the sentences ‘"x~unicorn(x)’, ‘"x~heptahedron(x)’ and ‘"x~male widow(x)’ must be 
as logically true (in the intuitive sense) as ‘"x~Æx’ (and ‘"x~(x¹x)’) would appear to be. ... Since sentences 
like ‘"x~unicorn(x)’, ‘"x~heptahedron(x)’, ‘"x~male widow (x)’ ... are not logical truths, in any traditional 
sense of ‘logical truth’, it seems clear to me that Sher’s move is not acceptable as a way of meeting the obvi-
ous objection posed by terms like ‘unicorn’. [Ibid., 19] 
3. Rebuttal 
It is a well-known and obvious fact that truth is relative to the use of words. If ‘uni-
corn’ were used as ‘elephant’ is commonly used in English, the sentence 
‘"x~unicorn(x)’ would be false. It is also quite obvious that the sentences 
‘"x~unicorn(x)’, ‘"x~heptahedron(x)’ and ‘"x~male widow (x)’ are not logically true 
when their English terms are used as they are ordinarily used in English: the truth of 
‘"x~unicorn(x)’ is based on a zoological fact, that of ‘"x~heptahedron(x)’ on a geo-
metrical fact, and that of ‘"x~male widow (x)’ on a linguistic fact. Are they logically 
true when their English terms are used in a non-standard way? That depends on how 
the terms are used. If ‘unicorn’ is used in the way ‘non self identical’ is commonly used 
in English, then (under this use) ‘"x~unicorn(x)’ is logically true. All this is compatible 
with my proposal. It follows from this proposal that the terms ‘unicorn’ ‘heptahedron’ 
and ‘male widow’, as they are commonly used in English, are extra-logical rather than logi-
cal, and as such they are “strongly variable”, i.e., every formally possible extension 
compatible with their syntactic category is assigned to them in some model (Sher 
1991: 47-8). In particular, these constants are assigned non-empty extensions in some 
models; in these models the sentences ‘"x~unicorn(x)’, ‘"x~heptahedron(x)’ and 
‘"x~male widow (x)’ are false; hence, these sentences do not come out logically true. 
Does the proposal advocate a non-standard use of English terms? No. The proposal of-
fers a set of conditions for using a term as a logical constant in a given language, but it 




should be used in semi-artificial languages (or how a symbol whose meaning is defined 
using a term like ‘unicorn’ is to be used in an artificial language).  
 Gómez-Torrente too, does not purport to legislate the use of terms in natural or 
artificial languages. He does not say that it is impossible, or forbidden, to use terms in 
a non-standard way, e.g., to use ‘unicorn’ as ‘non self identical’. What he says is that an 
adequate characterization of logical constants for a natural language like English, or 
for a semi-artificial language in which the natural-language expressions have their 
usual meaning, (or for a fully-artificial language in which certain symbols are defined 
using expressions like ‘unicorn’, ‘heptahedron’ and ‘male widow’, used as in ordinary 
English,) must be done in accordance with the observation that in such languages sen-
tences like ‘"x~unicorn(x)’, ‘"x~heptahedron(x)’ and ‘"x~male widow (x)’ are not 
logically true. And he is right. But he claims that the theory developed in Sher (1991) 
renders such sentences logically true. And this claim is wrong. To see where the error 
lies, let us examine how Gómez-Torrente arrives at this claim. His argument (as for-
mulated in the passage cited above) appears to be:  
1. The constants ‘unicorn’, ‘heptahedron’ and ‘male widow’ are logical accord-
ing to Sher’s (1991) characterization of logical constants. 
2. As logical constants, ‘unicorn’, ‘heptahedron’ and ‘male widow’ are defined 
by functions, funicorn, fheptahedron, and fmale-widow, which assign to every model A the 
empty set as its value. 
3. As a result, the sentences ‘"x~unicorn(x)’, ‘"x~heptahedron(x)’ and 
‘"x~male widow(x)’ are true in all models. 
4. It follows that these sentences are logically true according to Sher’s theory. 
 
This argument, however, relies on an erroneous premise, namely (1). Why does 
Gómez-Torrente believe that (1) is true? His argument for (1) appears to be the fol-
lowing: 
a. ‘Æ’ is a logical constant according to the definition of logical constants in Sher 
(1991). 
b. Under Sher’s proposal ‘Æ’, ‘unicorn’, ‘heptahedron’ and ‘male widow’ are all the 
same term. 
c. Therefore, under Sher’s proposal, ‘unicorn’, ‘heptahedron’, and ‘male widow’ are 
logical constants. 
But this argument, too, is based on an erroneous premise, namely, (b).  
 Why does Gómez-Torrente believe that (b) holds according to Sher (1991)? He 
does not say. My conjecture is that he reasons as follows: 
(i) According to Sher (1991) logical constants are identified with their extension.  
(ii) The extension of ‘Æ’ is the empty set, the extension of ‘unicorn’ is the empty 
set, the extension of ‘heptahedron’ is the empty set, and the extension of 
‘male widow’ is the empty set. 
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(iii) Therefore, according to Sher (1991), ‘Æ’, ‘unicorn’, ‘heptahedron’ and ‘male 
widow’ are the same term.  
But (iii) does not follow from (i) and (ii). What does follow from (i) and (ii) is: 
(iii’) If ‘unicorn’, ‘heptahedron’ and ‘male widow’ are logical constants according to 
Sher’s definition, and if their extensions in all models are the same as in the 
actual world, then they are the same logical constant as ‘Æ’.  
But (iii’) is a different conclusion from (iii). 
 The correctness of Gómez-Torrente’s criticism thus depends on whether ‘unicorn’, 
‘heptahedron’ and ‘male widow’, as they are used in the sentences above, are logical 
constants according to my proposal. I will show that they are not. 
 1. ‘Unicorn’. Let ‘"x~unicorn(x)’ be a sentence of a language L in which ‘unicorn’ 
has its usual English meaning. According to (LT), ‘unicorn’ is a logical constant of L 
iff either it is a truth functional connective of L or it satisfies the conditions (A)-(E) on 
logical constants in L. Clearly ‘unicorn’, as it is used in ordinary English, is not a truth-
functional connective (or any other kind of connective). The question is whether it 
satisfies the conditions (A)-(E) in L. Let us examine these conditions one by one. 
 Condition A. Condition (A) says that a logical constant is syntactically an n–place 
predicate or functor of level 1 or 2. ‘Unicorn’ is a 1-place predicate of level 1; as such 
it satisfies condition (A).  
 Condition B. Condition (B) says that a logical constant is defined by a single exten-
sional function and is identified with its extension. The nature of this extensional 
function is specified in Condition (C). 
 Condition C. Condition (C) says that a 1-place logical predicate of level 1, C, is de-
fined by a function fC over models, such that for every model A with a universe A in 
its domain, fC assigns to A a subset of A. The domain of fC is specified in Condition 
(D). 
 Condition D. Condition (D) says that the domain of fC is the class of all models for 
the given language; in particular, any set whatsoever, whether of existent or fictional 
objects, is the universe of some model2. 
 Taken together, conditions (B)-(D) say that: (i) a 1-place logical predicate C of level 
1 is defined by a single extensional function fC , such that fC is defined over all models 
for the language, and for every model A with a universe A, fC(A) is a subset of A; (ii) 
the meaning of C is fully and precisely captured by fC.3  
 Can ‘unicorn’ be construed in L as a logical constant in accordance with (B)-(D)? 
Strictly speaking, no. ‘Unicorn’ (as it is used in English) is a zoological predicate, and 
as such it is inapplicable to non-zoological, or at least to non-biological, objects – 
numbers, thoughts, planets, etc. It follows that the meaning of ‘unicorn’ would not be 
                                                   
2 In conversation Gómez-Torrente said that he took my definition to require that universes contain only 
existent objects. Although this clarification may suffice to remove the misunderstanding, I think an 
explanation of why the criticism does not hold is required to forestall further misunderstandings. 
3 This point is emphasized in Sher (1991), p. 56: “Condition (B) ensures that logical terms are rigid. Each 
logical term has a pre-fixed meaning in the metalanguage. This meaning is unchangeable and is com-




accurately captured by a function defined over models with universes consisting of 
(non-empty) sets of such objects. Hence construing ‘unicorn’ as a logical constant 
would violate condition (D).  
 Suppose, however, that we relax (B)-(D) by allowing certain conventional exten-
sions of partial functions capturing the meaning of logical constants. Suppose we 
adopt the following principles: 
(a) If a function that precisely captures the meaning of a logical constant C is par-
tial (i.e., defined over a proper subclass of all models), then a conventional 
extension of this function that does not seriously change the meaning of C is 
said to capture* its meaning. 
(b) One of the total functions that capture the meaning of C is (conventionally) 
designated as precisely capturing* its meaning. 
And we require that a logical constant be defined by a total function that precisely cap-
tures* its meaning. Suppose, further, that the meaning of ‘unicorn’ is precisely captured 
by the partial function funicorn, where 
(i)  the domain of funicorn is the class of all models whose universes contain real or 
fictional animals, and 
(ii)  for any model A in the domain of funicorn: if A is the universe of A, funicorn(A) = 
the set of unicorns in A. 
Then the total function f*unicorn, defined below is said to capture* the meaning of ‘uni-
corn’.  
 
 For any model A, 
         funicorn(A)    if A is in the domain of funicorn.  
 f*unicorn(A)=   
 The empty set  otherwise 
Let us further (conventionally) designate f*unicorn as precisely capturing* the meaning of 
‘unicorn’ in L. Then ‘unicorn’, as defined by f*unicorn, satisfies (B)-(D). Does it satisfy 
(E)? 
 Before turning to this question let me observe that if ‘unicorn’, thus defined, is 
considered a logical constant, Gómez-Torrente’s criticism does not apply. The reason 
is that under this definition ‘unicorn’ has a non-empty extension in some models 
(namely, models whose universes contain mythological animals of the kind unicorn), 
and as a result ‘"x~unicorn(x)’ will not come out logically true. Putting this issue 
aside, let us proceed to condition (E). Does ‘unicorn’, under the above definition, sat-
isfy condition (E)? 
 Condition E. Condition (E) says that a 1-place logical predicate of level 1, C, is de-
fined by a function fC which is invariant under isomorphisms of structures. That is, the 
following holds: 
If A and A’ are models with universes A and A’ respectively, bÎA, b’ÎA’ , and the 
structures <A,<b>> and <A’,<b’>> are isomorphic, then bÎ fC(A) iff b’Î 
fC(A’). 
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It is clear that f*unicorn does not satisfy this condition. Let A be a model whose universe, 
A, is a set of exactly one mythological animal – a unicorn, b. Let A’ be a model whose 
universe, A’, is a set if exactly one number, b’. Then the structures <A,<b>> and 
<A’,<b’>> are isomorphic, but bÎ f*unicorn (A) while b’Ï f*unicorn(A’). Similar considera-
tions will apply to other construals of ‘unicorn’ as a logical constant of L: if the re-
quirement that any set of objects (including sets of fictional animals) constitute the 
universe of some model for L is satisfied and the conditions (B)-(D) are satisfied, (E) 
will not be satisfied. 
 2. ‘Heptahedron’. Like ‘unicorn’, ‘heptahedron’ , as it is used in L (a language 
whose English terms preserve their usual meaning), is neither a truth-functional con-
nective nor, strictly speaking, a constant satisfying conditions (A)-(E): ‘Heptahedron’ 
is a geometrical predicate, and as such it is inapplicable to non-geometrical objects, 
e.g., thoughts; hence it is not defined over all models. Can we extend ‘heptahedron’ to 
all models along the lines described above, i.e., by a partly conventional function, 
f*heptahedron, that captures* it meaning? I will consider three cases: 
(i) ‘Heptahedron’ in English is well-defined over one-sided surfaces in accordance 
with Hilbert & Cohn-Vossen’s use (1952: 302-3), so that ‘heptahedron’ has a 
non-empty extension in some models. In that case we can construct 
f*heptahedron in a way that captures* the meaning of ‘heptahedron’, e.g., by pos-
tulating that its value for all models over which ‘heptahedron’ is not defined 
is the empty set. But then the reconstructed ‘heptahedron’ does not satisfy 
(E). (The reason is similar to that described in (iii) below.)  
 (ii) ‘Heptahedron’ in English is restricted to two-sided surfaces in Euclidean space 
and we construct f*heptahedron as assigning the empty set to all models. In that 
case, (the reconstructed) ‘heptahedron’ will not satisfy (B)-(D): (B)-(D) re-
quire that the definition of ‘heptahedron’ capture* its intended meaning in 
L, i.e., its English meaning. But if we define ‘heptahedron’ by f*heptahedron , this 
requirement is violated. Why? Because in that case the meaning of ‘hepta-
hedron’ in L is the same as the meaning of ‘Æ’ in L or that of ‘non-self-
identical’ in English. But ‘heptahedron’ is a geometrical concept, and as such 
its meaning in L (by assumption, its meaning in English) is very different from 
the meaning of the non-geometrical concept ‘Æ’ in L or that of ‘non self 
identical’ in English. 
(iii) ‘Heptahedron’ in English is as in (ii), but we overcome the problem with (ii) by 
constructing f*heptahedron as a function that “regards” one (conventionally des-
ignated) object with no geometric properties, b’, as a heptahedron in all 
models to which it belongs. In that case, however, (E) is violated. Why? 
Suppose A is a model with a universe A such that f*heptahedron(A) is the empty 
set. (There is such a model.) Take a model A’ with a universe A’ such that 
(a) b’ is a member of A’, and (b) the cardinality of A’ is the same as the car-
dinality of A. Let b be a member of A. Then the structures <A,<b>> and 
<A’,<b’ >> are isomorphic, but bÏ f*heptahedron(A) while b’Î f*heptahedron(A’). 




 It goes without saying that if we decide to use ‘unicorn’, ‘heptahedron’, and ‘male 
widow’ in a non-standard way (relative to their usual English use), then, depending on 
how we use them, they will or will not satisfy (LT). For example, if we decide to use 
them as “the empty predicate”, i.e., as a predicate whose meaning is fully captured by a 
function that assigns to all models the empty set, they will. But in that case Gómez-
Torrente’s criticism will no longer hold, since under this use ‘"x~unicorn(x)’, 
‘"x~heptahedron(x)’ and ‘"x~male widow (x)’ will be logically true. 
 This brings us to our next topic: the task (point, goal) of characterizations of logi-
cal constants. 
4. Three Characterization Tasks 
We may distinguish three types of precise and informative characterization of logical 
constants, according to the tasks they set out to accomplish: (i) a characterization of 
logical operators, (ii) a characterization of logical constants in logical languages, (iii) a 
characterization of logical constants in English (or some other natural language). 
 (i) A Characterization of Logical Operators. Logical operators, unlike logical constants, 
are not linguistic entities. Sometimes, however, the characterization of logical opera-
tors is given in terms of logical constants. A classical example is the characterization of 
the logical connectives as truth-functional. Although this characterization is formu-
lated as a characterization of linguistic entities (logical connectives), its main point is 
not linguistic: Every Boolean truth-function is a logical operator, and the logical op-
erators of sentential logic are exhausted by the Boolean truth functions. The challenge 
of developing an equally comprehensive, precise and informative characterization of 
logical operators for predicate logic was taken up by Mostowski (1957), Tarski (1966), 
Lindström (1966) and others, sometimes directly – as in Tarski (1966)4 and Sher 
(1991, Ch. 4) – and sometimes through a definition of logical constants – as in Sher 
(1991, Ch. 3)5. 
 Direct characterizations of logical operators – e.g., Tarski’s characterization – are, 
to begin with, immune to criticisms of the kind made by Gómez-Torrente; characteri-
zations of logical constants whose main aim (or one of whose main aims) is to charac-
terize logical operators – e.g., my characterization – are, to begin with, partially im-
mune. (The argument of the last section was intended to show that my characteriza-
tion eschews this criticism altogether.) The importance of characterizations of logical 
constants partly lies in their embedded characterization of logical operators.  
                                                   
4 Although Tarski (1966) called the objects he characterized “logical notions”, they were not linguistic (or 
conceptual) entities: “I use the term ‘notion’ ... to mean, roughly speaking, objects of all possible 
types in some hierarchy of types like that in Principia Mathematica. Thus notions included individuals 
..., classes of individuals, relations of individuals, classes of classes of individuals, and so on.” (P. 147) 
Such objects can be easily reconstrued as operators (here, functions from models to structures of ob-
jects within them). 
5 In Ch. 4 of Sher (1991) I give a characterization of logical constants “from below” that includes a direct 
characterization of logical operators; in Ch. 3 of Sher (1991) I give a characterization of logical con-
stants “from above” that includes an indirect characterization of logical operators. The characteriza-
tion I discuss in this paper is that of Ch. 3. 
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 (ii) A Characterization of Logical Constants in Logical Languages. This is the direct aim of 
my characterization. The idea is that one way to describe the scope and nature of logic 
is to describe (or give a set of instructions for) the construction of a logical system, 
and one important step in such a construction is the construction of logical constants. 
My characterization of logical constants is of this kind. It says that if you start with a 
background language in which the distinction between logical and non-logical con-
stants is not demarcated and you set out to construct a logical system with logical con-
stants taken from this language, you proceed as follows: Either (i) you pick out a term 
that can be introduced as a logical constant in accordance with (LT) without any sub-
stantial change to its original meaning, and introduce it as a logical constant in the sys-
tem you are constructing, or (ii) you pick out a term that cannot serve as a logical con-
stant in accordance with (LT) as it stands, and change its original meaning so that it 
can. It is in these ways that you can introduce English terms like ‘not’, ‘every’, ‘nine’, 
‘the number of planets’, ‘unicorn’, ‘heptahedron’, and ‘male widow’ (or symbols repre-
senting them) as logical constants in a logical system. ‘Not’ and ‘every’ require no sub-
stantive change; ‘nine’ can be used as a logical constant if it is construed as a 2nd-level 
predicate (predicate of predicates of individuals); ‘the number of planets’ can be used 
as a logical constant if it is construed as synonymous to (the 2nd-level) ‘nine’; and 
‘unicorn’, ‘heptahedron’ and ‘male widow’ can be used as logical constants if they are 
construed as synonymous with the empty predicate. To the extent that this characteri-
zation of logical constants concerns their use in formal systems and is not committed to 
preserving their meaning in a given background language, it is also immune to the type 
of criticism exemplified by Gómez-Torrente. 
 (iii) A Characterization of Logical Constants in Natural Languages. This is largely an em-
pirical enterprise, the enterprise of determining what terms speakers actually use as 
logical constants, either commonly or in certain contexts or circumstances. It is 
probably true that most people normally use ‘unicorn’, ‘heptahedron’ and ‘male 
widow’ as non-logical constants, but this is an issue that neither Tarski nor I have 
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